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Abstract. In this paper, we examine simultaneous relationship between leverage, maturity and 
over(under)- investment in emerging markets. We divide leverage into short term and long term to 
investigate the relation between current and future simultaneous relationship between leverage and 
investment decision, between debt maturity and investment decision, and between leverage and debt 
maturity. This research used twenty emerging market data from 2006 – 2016. First of all, our results 
show that firms in emerging markets prefer to use short-term debt to long-term debt to minimize the 
underinvestment problem. Second, there is a simultaneous non-linear relation between long-term lever-
age and growth opportunities in emerging markets firms. Third, long-term debt has non-linear effects 
on investment decision in emerging markets firms. It can be concluded that firms in emerging markets 
have different characteristics with regard to their capabilities to manage the interaction between lever-
age, maturity and investment compared to developed markets.
Keywords: leverage, debt maturity, investment, emerging markets.
I. Introduction 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that in a perfect capital market, financing and in-
vestment decisions are completely independent. Since that study, rich theoretical re-
search has found various frictions that drive linkages between financing and investment 
decision. Based on the theoretical model from McConell and Servaes (1995) and Lang 
et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005) find empirical evidence that leverage has a signifi-
cant effect on investment. Johnson (2003), Billett et al. (2007) and Dang (2011) exam-
ine how investment opportunities impact corporate financing policies. They find that 
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high-growth firms adopt low-leverage to mitigate underinvestment incentives. On the 
other hand, Ogden and Wu (2013) and Wu and Yeung (2012) argue that the growth 
opportunities and leverage have non-linear relationship because trade-off benefits and 
cost of debts may alter considerably as the growth opportunities change. In contrast, 
risks related with asset substitution for a firm that has substantial growth opportunities 
may increase severely.
Myers (1977) points out that outstanding debt may distort the firm’s investment 
incentives downward to maximize equity value. On the contrary, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that for firms with large free cash flow, debts can be used as a disciplining 
device because it can reduce overinvestment in risky projects. 
Debt maturity mitigates these agency conflicts in financing and investment deci-
sion (Myers, 1977; Barena et al., 1980; Childs et al., 2005). Since the short-term debt 
increases the financial flexibility of the firm, it reduces dramatically the agency costs of 
under- and overinvestment (Aivazian et al., 2005; Childs et al., 2005). Shorter term ma-
turity increases the control rights of lenders to discipline management that has the same 
incentives as the shareholders (Diamond & He, 2014). However, short-term debt has 
several disadvantages. Liquidity risk related to using the short-term debts can constrain 
the use of a short-term maturity debt (Diamond, 1991; Dang 2011). 
The majority of empirical evidence supports the role of short-term debts in reducing 
agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Guedes 
& Opler, 1996; Stohs & Maure, 1996; Ozkan, 2000; Dang, 2011). However, Hennessy 
(2004) shows that debt overhang effect is not reduced by the issuance of future se-
cured debt. Dang (2011) finds that debt maturity is unaffected by growth opportunities 
and does not mitigate the negative impact of growth opportunities on leverage. Dang 
(2011) argues that the relative importance of liquidity risk and debt overhang deter-
mine the level of leverage and debt maturity. 
Previous research conducted by Dang (2011) examines the potential interaction of 
corporate financing and investment decision that focus more on target leverage (Long-
Term Debt + Short-Term Debt). Our paper puts additional emphasis on  each  of short-
term and long-term leverage (current and future condition) to investigate the interac-
tion of corporate financing and investment decisions in emerging markets.
Effects of total leverage on investment are still debatable because of the above-men-
tioned contradictory theories and empirical evidence. So, the purpose of this research 
is to understand the dynamic interaction between long-term leverage, maturity, and 
over (under)- investment in emerging markets as seen from the side of short-term and 
long-term condition. The existing research on interaction of leverage, maturity and in-
vestment decision relies on the UK firms. Emerging market data allows us to take ad-
vantage of a considerable cross-country variation in important firm characteristics and 
institutional settings. Firms in emerging markets have a different legal and institutional 
setting and underdeveloped stock markets than Anglo-Saxon countries (La Porta et 
al., 1999). The majority of firms in emerging markets are characterized by highly con-
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centrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1999) and limited access to the long-term capital 
market. Firms in emerging market compared to the US markets have relatively limited 
options for long-term debts. 
2.  Theoretical framework and Hypotheses
2.1 Interaction between Long-term Leverage and Investment Decision
Myers (1977) proposed a theoretical model for interactions between leverage, debt 
maturity, and investment decision under conflicts of interest between debts and share-
holders. The potential transferring value of the investment projects results in the debt 
holders to encourage the firm to significantly decrease positive Net Present Value in-
vestment. Hennessy (2004) mentions that leverage does not only reduce the level but 
also the composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long-
lived assets. Even though debts provide the tax shield and other benefits, underinvest-
ment problems reduce optimal leverage of the firm ( Johnson, 2003). Then, if the firm 
has more valuable growth opportunities, it lowers its leverage or shortens the maturity 
of the debts (Myers, 1977). In contrast, Dang (2011) mentions that there is no strong 
evidence that by actively alleviating leverage to mitigate debt overhang, firms will be 
able to make more value-adding investments. 
On the other hand, Ogden and Wu (2013) and Wu and Yeung (2012) argue that 
the growth opportunities and leverage have non-linear relationship because trade-off 
benefits and cost of debts may alter considerably as the growth opportunities change. A 
firm with considerable growth opportunities has lower needs to discipline to limit over-
investment or debt overhang (Ogden & Wu, 2013). In contrast, risks related with asset 
substitution for a firm that has substantial growth opportunities may increase severely. 
Then those factors related with growth opportunities have negative effects on leverage 
with non-linear forms. 
Effects of total leverage on investment are still debatable because of the above-men-
tioned contradictory theories and empirical evidence. Simultaneous non-linear effects 
between growth opportunities and leverage may be seen more in the long-term debt 
measure than in total debts. Using the short-term debts may invoke a liquidity problem 
( Johnson, 2003; Childs et al., 2005), but it can reduce the underinvestment problem 
that has a long-term leverage. Short-term debts can mitigate potential conflicts related 
with growth opportunities and debt level, but not in the case of long-term debts.
H1: There is a simultaneous nonlinear relation between long-term leverage and growth op-
portunities.  
2.2 Interaction between Leverage and Debt Maturity
Diamond (1993) mentions that shorter debt maturity and leverage are strategic substi-
tutes for controlling debt overhang. Then, firms with growth opportunities always try 
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to shorten debt maturity so that growth opportunities should never negatively affect 
leverage ( Johnson, 2003). Further, Childs et al. (2005) show that financial flexibility 
using short-term debts significantly reduces the agency costs of under- and overinvest-
ment. Shortening debt maturity, however, simultaneously can incur various types of 
new costs related with the liquidity problem of shorter debt maturity ( Johnson, 2003; 
Childs et al., 2005). Childs et al. (2005) also argue that the firm tends to prefer using 
long-term debt, even though short-term debt can reduce agency cost from under- and 
overinvestment in the growth option. 
Since short debt maturity can mitigate underinvestment problems, it increases lev-
erage. However, it can also simultaneously increase liquidity risk. Then, it can reduce 
optimal leverage. Given these two counter effects, when choosing debt maturity or 
level of short and long-term debt, firms would trade off the cost of underinvestment 
problems against the cost of increased liquidity risk ( Johnson, 2003). The less finan-
cially flexible the firm, the more it reduces the leverage, but it still cannot shorten the 
maturity because of liquidity constraints (Childs et al., 2005). Then, the composition 
of the level of short and long-term leverage is endogenously determined with the trade-
off benefits and costs of using short-term debts ( Johnson, 2003). Dang (2011) also 
mentions that the choice of leverage and debt maturity is determined by the relative 
importance of over- and underinvestment problem. 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between debt maturity and investment.
H2b: There is a simultaneous negative relation between long-term debt and short-term debt.
2.3 Interaction between Debt maturity and Investment Decision
Shareholders may underinvest because they do not have incentives to initiate profita-
ble projects when most of the cash flows generated by the project are for debtholders 
(Myers, 1977). Stockholders may also undertake riskier investment projects since they 
may obtain larger profits with limited liabilities ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Diamond & 
He, 2014). In order to mitigate these conflicts of interest, creditors may act by granting 
shorter debt maturity to borrowers (Myers, 1977; Childs et al., 2005). Diamond and 
He (2014) argue that if all debt matures before the investment opportunities, then the 
firm without debt in place can make investment decisions as if an all-equity firm. 
Debt that matures soon should have reduced debt overhang (Childs et al., 2005; 
Diamond & He, 2014). The value of short-term debt is also less sensitive to the value of 
the firm. Thus, short-term debt seems to receive a smaller benefit from new investment. 
It means that short-term debt would reduce overhang more than long-term debt (Dia-
mond & He, 2014). 
However, short-term debt has several disadvantages. Short-term debt can reduce 
investment incentives severely when firm value declines after the debt is issued. Tit-
man and Tsyplakov (2007) and Diamond and He (2014) find that with the costs of 
adjusting leverage, short-term debt reduces debt overhang but it can trigger earlier de-
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fault. The lower sensitivity to firm value of short-term debt implies stronger overhang in 
bad times (Titman & Tsyplakov, 2007; Diamond & He, 2014). Hennessy (2004) also 
shows that debt overhang effect is not reduced by the issuance of future secured debt. 
Further, Childs et al. (2005) claim that even if short-term debt can reduce conflicts of 
incentives to growth opportunities, this benefit of a reduction of agency costs must be 
traded off with the cost of liquidity risk of refunding short-term debt. Dang (2011) 
finds that debt maturity is unaffected by growth opportunities and does not mitigate 
the negative impact of growth opportunities on leverage. Dang (2011) argues that the 
relative importance of liquidity risk and debt overhang determines the level of leverage 
and debt maturity. 
Further, in general, the majority of the countries in developing market have a bank-
based financial system with limited options for long-term debt outside banks. This in-
stitutional condition will reduce the mitigating effects of short-term debt on agency 
conflicts. Though there is an increase in the liquidity risk using short-term debt, it still 
can reduce the attenuation of the negative effect of growth opportunities. 
H3: Short-term debts have positive effects on investment decision.
Previous research used variable leverage that is measured by total debt divided by 
market value of equity plus book value of debt. In contrast, we spread variable lever-
age into two variables. This spread is conducted to determine the relation of each dif-
ferent maturity debt to investment decision.  As Myers (1977) mentioned, long-term 
debts may invoke more substantial underinvestment and overinvestment problem than 
short-term debts. Long-term debt level has negative effects on the level of investment 
of a firm. However, variability of debt overhang or the underinvestment problem may 
depend on the long-term debt level. To a certain level of long-term debts, under- and/
or overinvestment problem can increase the related agency cost linearly. In contrast, if 
the long-term debt level is higher than a certain level, related costs of under/ and over-
investment may increase more rapidly than the lower level.
H4: Long-term debt has nonlinear effects on investment decision.
3  Methodology
3.1  Empirical Models
We specify the leverage equation based on the dynamic partial adjusted model (Flan-
nery & Ragan, 2006), which means we use lagged long-term debt as an independent 
variable. The determinants of  control variables that we used, such as profitability, size, 
and tangibility, are adopted from Rajan and Zinglas (1995). Then we argument it by 
including our variables of interest as follows:
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൅ ߙ଼ܩܴܱܲ כ ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ ൅ ߙଽܶܣܰܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܴܱܲܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ݀௖ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧
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where LTD, MAT, GROP, GROPSQ INV, TANG, SIZE, PROF present long-term 
debt, debt maturity, growth opportunities, square of growth opportunities, invest-
ments, asset tangibility, firm size, and profitability. µi represents the time-invariant un-
observable firm, and dc represents the time-invariant unobservable institutional and 
regulatory country specific fixed effects, and ∈i,t shows the error term in such a way that 
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 Variable definitions can be found in Table 1. We argue the following 
debt maturity equation of Dang (2011):
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AMAT, TERM, TAX, AGE, and CFVOL donate asset maturity structure, term 
structure of interest rates, tax rate, firm age, and cash flow volatility. τi represents the 
time-invariant unobservable firm, ωc represents the time-invariant unobservable insti-
tutional and regulatory country specific fixed effects, and ei,t the error term in such a way 
that 
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 We adopt investment equation based on Aivazian et al. (2005) 
and extend variables of interest as follows:
ܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܫܰ ௜ܸǡ௧ ൅ ߙସܵܶܦ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙହܩܴܱ ௜ܲǡ௧ ൅ ߙ଺ܩܴܱܲܵܳ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧
൅ ߙ଼ܩܴܱܲ כ ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ ൅ ߙଽܶܣܰܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଵଵܴܱܲܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ݀௖ ൅ ߳௜ǡ௧
 
ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܫܰ ௜ܸǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܩܴܱ ௜ܲǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܵܶܦ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܩܴܱܲ כ ܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଼ܩܴܱܲ כ ܵܶܦ௜ǡ௧ߚଽܣܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚଵଵܶܧܴܯ௜ǡ௧൅ߚଵଶܶܣ ௜ܺǡ௧൅ߚଵଷܥܨܸܱܮ௜ǡ௧൅ߚଵସܴܱܲܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߬௜ ൅ ߱௖ ൅ ݁௜ǡ௧
 
߳௜ǡ௧̱݅݅݀ሺͲǡ ߪఢଶ). 
 
݁௜ǡ௧̱݅݅݀ሺͲǡ ߪ௘ଶ).
ܫܰ ௜ܸǡ௧ ൌ ߛଵ ൅ ߛଶܫܰ ௜ܸǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଷܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛସܮܶܦܵܳ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛହܵܶܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ଺ܩܴܱ ௜ܲǡ௧ିଵ
൅ ߛ଻ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ଼ܩܴܱܲ כ ܯܣ ௜ܶǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଽܩܴܱܲ כ ܮܶܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵ଴ܩܴܱܲ כ ܵܶܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ
൅ ߛଵଵܱܥܨ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଵଶܥܨܸܱܮ௜ǡ௧ିଵ൅ߛଵଷܷܴܶ ௜ܰǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߮௜ ൅ ߨ௖ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧
 
where OCF donates operating cash flow, φi represents the time-invariant unobservable 
firm, ωc represents the time-invariant unobservable institutional and regulatory country 
specific fixed effects, and εi,t the error term in such a way that ߝ௜ǡ௧̱݅݅݀ሺͲǡ ߪఌଶ). 
3.2 Data
We used an unbalanced panel data of several developing countries based on the lists 
of the International Monetary Fund because the International Monetary Fund list of 
developing countries is reliable and representative.  The countries included are Bang-
ladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Paki-
stan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Argentina, and Poland. Data are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream database 
from 2006 to 2016 to see changes in capital structures over 10 years in emerging mar-
kets. We assume that the last 10 years of data is enough to show the contemporary 
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corporate financing and investment decisions of emerging markets. We impose several 
restrictions on the data. First of all, we exclude firms operating in financing sectors and 
in utilities sectors. Observations that have missing data for the variables of interest are 
removed. We retain firms that have been observed for five years and more because of 
the need of lag variables in the estimation process using GMM. We apply the GMM 
method, because our empirical analysis is conducted with a dynamic panel model that 
has an inherent endogeneous problem to improve consistency and efficiency of the es-
timates. Year and country are used as dummy variables to control differences in macro-
economic, government and policy regulations among countries. We apply a two stage 
least square analysis because we have three simultaneous equations that need instru-
mental variables that solve the simultaneous bias problem. We winsorize all variables at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to attenuate the effects of outliers. 
TABEL 1. List of Country Names & Number of Observations
No. Country Number of Observations Percentage (%)
1 Bangladesh 180 0.38%
2 Brazil 1860 3.88%
3 China 11540 24.08%
4 Colombia 210 0.44%
5 Hungary 160 0.33%
6 India 11180 23.33%
7 Indonesia 2420 5.05%
8 Malaysia 5830 12.17%
9 Mexico 740 1.54%
10 Pakistan 1120 2.34%
11 Philippines 990 2.07%
12 Russia 900 1.88%
13 South Africa 1640 3.42%
14 Thailand 3140 6.55%
15 Turkey 1920 4.01%
16 Ukraine 190 0.40%
17 Venezuela 30 0.06%
18 Vietnam 1260 2.63%
19 Argentina 420 0.88%
20 Poland 2190 4.57%
Total   47920 100.00%
Source : Data processing (2018)
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Even if the total observation we used was 47920 from 20 countries, when  we run 
regression, every regression has less than 47920 observations, because some variables 
among them are missing (Tables 4, 5). As we see from Table 1, firms from China and 
India contribute 47%  of all observations, while firms from Bangladesh, Ukraine and 
Venezuela make up less than 1% from the total observations.
3.3  Definition of Variables
The purpose of this research is to understand the interaction among long-term & short-
term leverage, Debt Maturity, Growth opportunity and investment in emerging mar-
kets. So, we emphasize on the result from those four variables and their interaction with 
each other. The long-term debt (LTD) can be obtained from Book Value of Long-Term 
Debt divided by Market Value of Equity and Book Value of Debt. The short-term debt 
(STD) variables can be obtained from  Book Value of Short-Term Debt divided by To-
tal Assets. Growth Opportunity (GROP) has been calculated from the sum of Market 
Value of Equity and Book Value of Debt divided by total assets. The rationale for using 
these formulae to measure growth opportunities is the application of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s 
Q is a performance measure of a company by comparing two values of the same asset, 
whereas total asset as a denominator reflects replacement of costs, and Market Value of 
Equity as a numerator reflects future prospect value of market. If there is an increasing 
value, the profit is likely to be obtained. Based on Tobin’s Q we assume that an incentive 
to make new investment capital is high when market value of shares provides benefits 
in the future.  The variable Debt Maturity (MAT) is derived from Long-Term Debt that 
matures after one year divided by the total debt. Investments Variables (INV) are de-
rived from capital expenditure minus depreciation and then divided by lagged net PPE 
(Property, Plant and Equipment). 
The other additional control variables such as Cash Flow Volatility (CFVOL) are 
derived from the difference between annual percentage change in EBITD and the aver-
age of this change. Variable Asset Tangibility is derived from Net PPE divided by total 
assets. Variable Size is measured as logs of sales. Variable Profitability (PROF) is de-
rived from EBITD divided by Total Assets. Variable Asset Maturity Structure  (AMAT) 
is derived from Net PPE divided by depreciation. Variable Term structure is obtained 
from the difference between 10-year government bond and 1-year government bond 
from each country. Variable Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is calculated from EBIT plus 
depreciation, then divided by Total Assets. Variable Efficiency of Investment (TURN) 
is derived from Sales divided by Total Assets. The last one, variable Tax Rate, is derived 
from the total tax charge divided by pre-tax income.
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4.  Result and Discussion
4.1 Correlations Between Variables
In this section, we specify the correlation between each variable that has been sum-
marized in Table 2. Growth opportunity variable has the highest correlation with 
Long-Term Debt and Short-Term Debt. This correlation result shows higher cor-
relation between growth opportunities and leverage level of the firm. Long-Term 
Debt (Short-Term Debt) has a positive (negative) correlation with Debt Maturity 
of 0.05 (-0.16). It is consistent with liquidity risk hypothesis that explains that firms 
with long-term debt maturity (Short-Term Debt Maturity) will face low (high) li-
quidity risk and will have an incentive to increase (decrease) leverage (Dang, 2011).
Investment has a positive (negative) correlation with long-term debt (short-
term debt) of 0.06 (-0.03). This is consistent with underinvestment hypothesis that 
states that to control the underinvestment problem, firms need to reduce their lev-
erage, without shortening debt maturity. 
TABLE 2. Correlations, Probabilities between Variables
 
Long Term 
Debt
Short Term 
Debt
Debt 
Maturity
Investment Tax Rate 
Asset 
Maturity 
Structure
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
Growth 
Opportunities
Asset 
Tangibility
Profitability
Term 
Structure 
Operating 
Cash Flow
Efficiency of
Investment
Size
Long Term Debt 1.00
Short Term Debt 0.02 1.00
Debt Maturity 0.05 -0.16 1.00
Investment 0.06 -0.03 0.01 1.00
Tax Rate 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.05 1.00
Asset Maturity Structure 0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.18 -0.04 1.00
Cash Flow Volatility 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00
Growth Opportunities 0.71 0.70 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 1.00
Asset Tangibility 0.30 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.35 -0.01 0.24 1.00
Profitability -0.09 -0.22 0.01 0.06 0.17 -0.14 0.11 -0.21 0.04 1.00
Term Structure -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.19 1.00
Operating Cash Flow -0.09 -0.22 0.01 0.06 0.17 -0.14 0.11 -0.22 0.04 0.31 -0.02 1.00
Efficiency of Investment -0.18 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.09 -0.27 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.25 -0.04 0.25 1.00
Size 0.14 0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.27 1.00
Source: Data processing (2018)
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we first summarize and discuss the empirical results. We then exam-
ine the evidence that supports our hypothesis for the interaction among Long-Term 
Debt, Short-Term Debt, Debt Maturity and Growth Opportunity and our findings 
that reject our hypothesis. 
Long-term debts and short-term debts have a small portion of 25 percentile, or 
almost zero. It means that many firms in emerging markets do not use debts as their 
source of funding. All information regarding debts shows that they use more short-term 
debt than long-term debt. The debt maturity variable until 75% percentile is still below 
1. It is consistent with the short-term debt dominance in emerging markets. In contrast, 
in the previous research by Dang (2011), Debt maturity of 75% percentile in UK firms 
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is 1. It means, in developed markets, firms use more long-term debt (debt that matures 
after one year) than short-term debt. 
Cash flow volatility shows a relatively big standard deviation of 2.161. It shows that 
cash flow of the firm in emerging markets is highly volatile. Some countries’ cash flow 
volatility increases a lot during the financial crisis period between 2008 and 2009. In 
UK firms cash flow volatility between 1996 – 2003 is relatively stable.
Growth opportunities show the mean value of 0.266 and maximum value of 0.397. 
This score is still below one. It means that growth opportunities in emerging markets 
are still low compared to developed markets (UK firms), which is indicated by the fact 
the mean value of Growth opportunities in UK is 1.794 and their maximum value is 
9.800. 
4.3 Main Results
Table 2 presents the results for three models which adopt the GMM estimator. AR 
tests suggest that all three models are quite satisfactory. But there is one model, Debt 
Maturity equation, which shows AR test 4%, a little bit lower than 5%. The number 
of observations from leverage equation is 42,658. Debt maturity equation has 42,561 
observations and Investment equation has 42,842 observations. We also use Year & 
Country as dummy variables. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Percentile 
(25%)
Median 
(50%)
Percentile 
(75%)
Long Term Debt 0.118 0.146 0.002 0.062 0.183
Short Term Debt 0.144 0.142 0.027 0.106 0.218
Investment 0.107 0.369 -0.040 0.023 0.147
Debt Maturity 0.711 1.589 0.033 0.376 0.716
Tax Rate (%) 0.163 0.217 0.309 0.158 0.282
Asset Maturity Structure 14.177 12.615 7.149 10.813 16.069
Cash Flow Volatility (%) -0.077 2.161 -0.451 -0.045 0.377
Growth Opportunities 0.266 0.210 0.089 0.243 0.397
Asset Tangibility 0.345 0.219 0.165 0.326 0.504
Profitability 0.093 0.102 0.050 0.093 0.147
Term Structure (%) 0.709 1.608 0.250 0.680 1.440
Operating Cash Flow 0.099 0.102 0.050 0.093 0.147
Efficiency of Investment 0.890 0.662 0.425 0.756 1.175
Size 6.400 1.217 5.652 6.306 7.004
Source : Data Processing (2018)
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
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TABEL 2. Regression Results
  Long-Term Debt Asset Maturity Structure Investment
LTD 0.239
(0.596)
LTD (t-1) 0.137*** 6.031*
(0.000) (0.096)
LTD (t-1)square 10.06*
(0.091)
STD(t) -0.834*** 1.191**
(0.000) (0.037)
STD(t-1) 4.430
(0.147)
GROP(t) 1.054*** -0.803
(0.000) (0.111)
GROP(t)square -0.346***
(0.000)
GROP(t-1) -2.710
(0.367)
MAT(t) 0.0000
(0.977)
MAT(t-1) 0.818*** 0.102
(0.000) (0.521)
INV(t) -0.0044 0.018
(0.437) (0.717)
INV(t-1) 0.225***
(0.000)
CFVOL(t) 0.003**
(0.031)
CFVOL(t-1) -0.002*
(0.056)
TANG(t) 0.0026 0.067
(0.186) (0.599)
Size(t) -0.0016 0.036***
(0.167) (0.000)
PROF(t) -0.011** -0.426
(0.030) (0.138)
AMAT(t) -0.000
(0.969)
158 
  Long-Term Debt Asset Maturity Structure Investment
TERM(t) 0.002
(0.196)
OCF(t-1) 0.113
(0.369)
TURN(t-1) 0.039
(0.402)
TAX(t) 0.060
(0.000)
GROP*LTD(t) 0.746
(0.159)
GROP*LTD(t-1) -11.67***
(0.005)
GROP*STD (t) -0.756
(0.261)
GROP*STD(t-1) -1.076
(0.791)
GROP*MAT(t) 0.014
(0.329)
GROP*MAT(t-1) -0.839
(0.263)
Estimators GMM GMM GMM
Number of Observa-
tions 42658 42561 42842
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) test -4.62, (0.00)*** -10.77, (0.00)*** -19.62, (0.00)***
AR(2) test -1.85, (0.06)* -0.84, (0.04)** -0.02, (0.98)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The first columns in Table 2 report the result for leverage equations. The coefficient 
on Short-Term Debt is found to be significantly negative at the 1% significance level and 
coefficient -0.834. This finding supports Dang (2011), who claimed that a firm with a 
short-term debt maturity structure faces a potential liquidity risk problem, which can 
be mitigated by adopting a low-leverage policy. In contrast, firms with long-term debt 
face a less severe liquidity risk and will be able to use more leverage.  This finding sup-
ports our hypothesis H2b, i.e. there is a simultaneous negative relation between long-
term debt and short-term debt.  Previous research conducted by Dang (2011), using 
UK company data between 1996-2003,  did not examine short-term debt relation to 
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Leverage, Debt Maturity and Investment in his model. Previous research used variable 
leverage that included both Short-Term and Long-Term Debt. Our research examined 
both of these variables separately to understand the impact of interaction between cor-
porate financing and investment decision in a short term.
The GROP variable is significant at 1% and has 1.054 coefficient. Other than that, 
GROP2 variable is negatively significant at 1% which has -0.346 coefficient. This result 
supports our H1, which states that ‘there is a simultaneous non linear relation between 
long-term leverage and growth opportunities.’ Leverage in developing countries will 
not be negatively affected  by growth opportunity if the firms have lower leverage, but 
if they increase their leverage higher, their growth opportunity could negatively affect 
leverage. This is consistent with Ogden and Wu (2013), Wu and Yeung (2012) that 
there are trade-off benefits, and the cost of debt may alter considerably as the growth 
opportunities change. In previous research conducted by Dang (2011) in UK firms, 
Growth Opportunity had a significantly negative relation with Leverage. It means firms 
with growth opportunities control underinvestment problem by reducing their lever-
age without shortening debt maturity. 
The second columns report the results for Debt Maturity equation. Short-Term 
Debt variable has significant positive effect on Debt maturity structure at 5% signif-
icance level and coefficient 1.191. This result is consistent with Myres (1977), who 
suggests Short-Term Debt as a possible solution to the Debt overhang problem. This 
extends the idea that, if all debt matures before investment opportunity, firms without 
debt can make investment decisions as if they were all-equity firms. Following this log-
ic, debt that matures soon should have reduced overhang. So, it can be concluded that 
Short-Term Debt has a positive relation with Debt Maturity to reduce the Overhang 
Effect. Variable investment has positive relation but not significant. So, this result does 
not support our H2a hypothesis because there is no negative relationship between debt 
maturity and investment. Previous research only focused on the relation between Debt 
Maturity and Growth Opportunities and found that there was no significant relation 
between them, which is also consistent with our result.
The third columns report the results for Investment equation. Lagged Long-Term 
Debt has a weakly influence on investment because it has 10% significance level and 
6.031 coefficient. This result supports our hypothesis H4 that long-term debt has 
non-linear effects on investment decision. Myres (1977) mentioned that the variability 
of debt overhang or underinvestment problem may depend on the long-term debt level. 
At a certain level of long-term debt, an underinvestment problem can occur. But, if the 
long-term debt level is below the certain level, underinvestment will not occur. Previ-
ous research shows that Lagged leverage is negatively related to firm investment at 1% 
significance level, which supports the prediction of agency theory. Previous research 
used variable leverage that is measured by total debt divided by market value plus book 
value of debt, whereas we use long-term debt only to examine the individual relation to 
investment. 
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Lagged investment is positively significant at 5% significance level, supporting the 
existence of an accelerator effect in which current investment is determined by past in-
vestment. Our results are consistent with the previous research by Dang (2011). How-
ever, the other variables that have a negatively significant relation to investment at 1% 
significance level and coefficient -11.67 are Lagged Growth Opportunities x Lagged 
Long-Term Debt. This result supports the previous research by Dang (2011) and Myres 
(1977) that Growth opportunities and Long-Term Leverage should have negative re-
lation to investment. Myres (1977) demonstrates that in high-growth firms with risky 
debt managers acting in the interest of shareholders may forgo positive Net Present 
Value projects, because the payoff of these projects would at least partially accrue to 
debt-holders, hence leading to an underinvestment or Debt Overhang Problem. Lagged 
Short-Term Debt has positive effect on investment but not significant. This finding does 
not support our hypothesis H3. 
4.4 Robustness Test 
We divide firms based on the median of size. When the size is bigger than the median, 
we regard it as a big firm. When the size is smaller than the median, we classify this as a 
small firm. In this section, we conduct robustness test for size. We mostly obtain similar 
results to the main result. It means that each variable on the robustness test shows the 
same direction of each coefficient with the main result. However, differences are of the 
significant value for several variables.  First, Long-Term Debt equation for a small size, 
variable Grop*Mat(t) is significantly positive at 5 %, whereas  our empirical result finds 
that interaction between growth opportunity and Debt Maturity has positive but not 
significant relation toward the long-term leverage. Second, the robustness test on both 
small and big size in the Debt Maturity Equation shows that several variables are signif-
icant toward Debt Maturity, otherwise in our main result, Short-Term Debt is the only 
significant variable toward Debt Maturity. In the investment equation, the lagged Debt 
Maturity variable is significant at 5% but our main result shows that such a variable is 
insignificant. The interaction variable between growth opportunity and lagged Long-
term debt is significantly negative at 1% in our regression result. On the other hand, the 
variable of interaction between growth opportunity and lagged long-term debt in our 
robustness test in insignificant. 
5.  Conclusions
This paper examines the simultaneous interaction of long-term & short-term leverage, 
debt maturity, and investment in emerging markets (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colom-
bia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Argentina). Previous re-
search has already examined the interaction of corporate financing and investment de-
cisions in developed markets. 
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Our results show some points of view. Using the company data in emerging coun-
tries over the period 2006 – 2016 we find that: First, firms in emerging markets prefer to 
use short-term debt to long-term debt to minimize the underinvestment problem. Sec-
ond, there is a simultaneous nonlinear relation between long-term leverage and growth 
opportunities in a firm in an emerging market. Third, long-term debt has nonlinear ef-
fects on the investment decision in emerging market firms. Our results reinforce the 
view of La Porta et al. (1999) that firms in emerging markets are characterized by highly 
concentrated ownership and have relatively limited options for long-term debts. It can 
be concluded that firms in emerging markets have different characteristics with regard 
to their capabilities to manage the interaction between leverage, maturity and invest-
ment compared to developed markets.
5.1 Managerial Implications
Based on the results, managers in high-growth firms can mitigate the underinvestment 
problem without lowering their leverage, but they need to use short-term debt instead 
of long-term debt. Debt matures before investment opportunity, so they can take the in-
vestment opportunity because there is no debt to bear. Managers in high-growth firms 
do not have to worry about long-term leverage, because long-term leverage and growth 
opportunities have a non linear relation. As long as their long-term debt is below a cer-
tain level, it would not lead to the underinvestment problem.  
5.2 Limitation
However, we also realize that our study has a particular limitation and it still needs 
further exploration in broader contexts. Our research does not examine the macroe-
conomic conditions and legal differences among each country in emerging markets. 
It would be worth expanding the topic into macroeconomic and legal regulations for 
future research. 
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Appendix
TABLE 5. Robustness Test for Size
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TABLE 6: Variable Definitions
No. Variable Definition
Panel A: Leverage Equation
1 Long-term debt [LTD] Book value of long-term debt divided by the market value of equity plus book value of debt;
2 Growth Opportunities [GROP] Market value of equity plus book value of debt di-vided by total assets;
3 Asset Tangibility [TANG] Net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by total assets;
4 Profitability [PROF] Earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation (EBITD) divided by total assets;
5 Size [SIZE] Log of sales.
Panel B: Maturity Equation
1 Debt maturity [MAT] Long-term debt that matures after one year divided by total debt;
2 Asset maturity structure [AMAT]
Net property, plant and equipment(PPE) divided by 
depreciation;
3 Term structure [TERM] Difference between 10-year government bond and 1 year government bond;
4 Tax rate [TAX] Total tax charge divided by pre-tax income;
5 Cash flow volatility [CFVOL] Difference between annual % change in EBITD and average of this change.
Panel C : Investment Equation
1 Investment [INV] Capital expenditure less depreciation divided by lagged  PPE;
2 Operating cash flow [OCF] EBIT plus depreciation divided by total assets;
3
4 
Efficiency of investment 
[TURN]
Short-term debt [STD]
Sales divided by total assets;
Book value of short-term debt divided by total assets.
